Reproduced Construction Excerpts from Assorted Reports ~ The As-Built History of the Island Battery, By Eric Krause, 2005

The [Royal ]battery was designed solely with the intention of defending, by cross-fire with the Island Battery, the entrance to the anchorage before the town, and to that of the northeast harbour. If, on the contrary, the right face had been so placed as to have covered the town anchorage, its guns could as easily have been used to devastate the city. This anchorage is in any case adequately defended by the battery of the Dauphin demi-bastion. The left face of the Royal Battery defends the larger part of the northeast anchorage by a cross-fire with the Island Battery ...

In the spring of 1736 Verrier informed the Minister that he considered it necessary to cover the "summits" of the embrazures in a manner similar to that employed on the towers of the battery during the previous year - i.e., a wooden roofing.[3] This also was given the minister's approval, but apparently no immediate action was taken to pat the plan into effect, as it was reported to the Minister in November of the same year that Verrier had had a thick bed of mortar laid on the "summits" of the embrazures without applying earthing.[5] Sabatier, who made this report, was of the opinion that the application of the mortar was merely an experiment, and that it would eventually be found necessary to apply the turfing.[6] Verrier was in fact probably postponing the operation of turfing in the hopes that he might be able to carry out his alternate project for wooden coverings.[7] St.Ovide and Le Normant thought, however, that before this step should be taken, the results of the turfing of merlons at other Louisbourg batteries should be observed.[8] Verrier seems to have come around to their opinion, for on 10 November 1736 he reported that he intended to cover the "summits" of the Royal Battery embrazures with earth and turf in order to preserve the masonry.[9] In addition he pointed out that it would not be necessary at the Royal Battery to level ("razer") these summits by two pied as had been done at the Island Battery, the Royal Battery being less exposed to damage by sea-spray. He proposed, however, to level the summits of the following walls at the battery:

3. AC B V.64 ff.488v-490, Minister to St. Ovide and Le Normant, 25 May 1736.

7. AC C11B V.18 ff.11-15v, St. Ovide and Le Normant to Minister, 7 November 1736.

English journals and diaries made during the siege year 1745 give the numbers of embrazures at the battery variously as forty, thirty-two, and thirty-three, and can therefore not be taken as trustworthy.[17] The Accurate Journal, however, mentions that two flanks of two guns each (i.e., obviously the right flanks of the battery itself and of the éperon) point towards the town, and a line of ten guns (i.e., the right face of the battery) against the Island Battery, thus seemingly confirming the account given above of the reduction in the number of the embrazures.[18] ...

17. Louisbourg Journals 1745 , Ed. L.E. de Forest, First Journal (Anonymous ), p. 52 / Diary Kept at the Siege of Louisbourg March 15, August 14, 1745, J. Emerson, p.2o / Louisbourg Journals 1745, Ed.L.E. de Forest, Seventh Journal, Mygate and Lamb, p.104.

18. An Accurate Journal and Account of the Proceedings of the New England and Forces during the Late Expedition Againat the French Settlements on Cape Breton To the Time of the Surrender of Louisbourg, p.13, 27.

The only suggestion that the Royal Battery might possibly escape demolition occurred in the London Magazine for September 1760, which reported that all the fortifications at Louisbourg were to be demolished "except the battery towards the land side, which is to remain." [1]This vague reference might have been an `illusion to the Royal Battery; in any event the Royal Battery, along with the Island Battery, was one of the last structures at Louisbourg to be destroyed by the British demolition teams ...

In all probability the cannons used for these services were the six which the Minister had recommended be left in position at the battery in 1752, a supposition supported by the face that in July 1755 Drucour reported that only six cannons remained at the battery.[41] However, later in the summer of that year, following the advice of Salvert and Drucour, six additional cannon were placed at the Royal Battery, making a total of twelve 36-pounders. [42] This equipment apparently remained in the battery until the summer of 1757, when Bois de la Mothe had all the guns removed, sending six to the Island Battery and six to the Light House Battery.[43] The Royal Battery was thus devoid of artillery when the English occupied it in 1758, and apparently remained in this condition until its demolition in 1760. ...

43. An Marine Sér. B4 V.76 ff.20-25, Unsigned, Undated 1757 / AC C11C V.16 Pièce 13, Unsigned / (The reference to thrity-six cannons in these two documents is obviously a mistake, since the Royal Battery had only thirty-two embrazures at this time. Evidently it is a confusion of the calibre number with the number of guns.) Archives du Service Historique de l'Armée, Sér. Al Art. 3457 Pièce 89 bis p.232, Pontleroy, 22 Play 1757 / CO 5 V.53 ff.37-38, Unsigned, 1758.

Meanwhile a detachment of four hundred New England troops had marched around to the north-east end of the harbour, burning the store-houses and fish-stages there which were approximately one mile from the Royal Battery.[47] It was this action which apparently provided the initial stimulus for the French evacuation. On the morning of 2 May (OS) Captain Vaughan with a detachment of thirteen men entered the deserted battery, which was to have been attacked by Bradstreet that night with 500 picked men.[48] Vaughan immediately relayed the news of the battery's capture to Pepperrell, [49] who thereupon sent a detachment of men under Bradstreet to reinforce Vaughan and secure possession of the battery. [50] Before Bradstreet's man could arrive, the French had made a futile attempt to recapture the battery by an eight-boat amphibious assault, and had been beaten off by Vaughan's men and some marauders, after which the French began to bombard the battery with balls and bombs both from the Island Battery and from the town.[51] ...

47. Early American Imprints 1639-1800, Evans No. 6307, American Antiquarian Society, William Douglass, A Summary, Historical and Political..., V.l, p.348.

48. Louisbourg Journals 1745, Ed. L. E. de Forest, Tenth Journal Bradstreet , p.174.

49. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V..10, p.138, Vaughan to Pepperrell, 2 May 1745 (OS).

51. Louisbourg Journals 1745, Ed. L. E. de Forest, First Journal, p. 11 / The Journal of Sir William Pepperrell Kept During the Expedition Against Louisbourg, pp. 18-19.

Pepperrell seems to have provided Bradstreet with the required personnel, for by 10 a. m. of May 3 (03) one cannon was drilled out [55] and the same day the Royal Battery opened fire on the town to good effect - the third, fourth, and fifth shots fired reputedly entering the citadel through its roof.[56] The French returned this fire with bombs and balls from the Island Battery, but in spite of this annoyance Waldo concentrated his fire on the town in order to distract the French garrison there from Pepperrell's movements at other points on the perimeter.[57] ...

57. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10, pp.140-145, Waldo to Pepperrell, 3 May 1745 (08).

Firing on the town continued despite this accident, and the following table gives Waldo's first-hand account of the exchange of fire between the Royal Battery and the French in the City and the Island Battery:

For the remainder of the siege, the Royal Battery played a triple role: firsts it continued its own artillery bombardment of the city; second, it was considered as a point from which attacks against. both the town and the Island Battery might be launched; and, third, it served as an advanced base to support new siege-works and to extend the range of the English patrols ....

To consider first the Royal Battery's basic role, that of a siege-battery; the battery continued to concentrate its fire on the western portion of the town, although it was continually hindered by lack of powder, ammunition, and trained gunners.[67] The un-spiking of the guns continued, however, and by 12 May (OS) twenty of the battery's guns were ready for service although only four could be brought to bear on the town.[68] The remainder pointed towards the harbour and the Island Battery, and although Waldo did not want to waste ammunition in attempting to hit the Island Battery,[69] he declared himself ready to use these guns against any French ships attempting to enter the harbour.[70] ...

67. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser., V.10 pp.157-159, Waldo to Pepperrell, 8 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.166-168, Waldo to Pepperrell, 13 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.190-191, Waldo to Pepperrell, 20 May 1745 (OS).

69. Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Ser. V.10, pp.166-168, Waldo to Pepperrell, 13 May 1745 (OS.

Early in the siege the Royal Battery had been placed in its second role - that of a staging-point for attacks against the city or the Island Battery. As early as 8 May (OS), Waldo offered fifty to one hundred volunteers for what apparently was to have been an attack on either the islôt or the town, launched from the Royal Battery, but this scheme seems to have been postponed due to lack of sufficient time for preparations.[73] Three days later, on 11 May (OS), Vaughan volunteered to lead an attack on the Island Battery using boats assembled at the Royal Battery,[74] and on May 16 (OS) Warren outlined a plan for the attack on the city itself involving an assault launched by water from the Royal Battery against the city's harbour front coordinated with attacks at two other points on the perimeter of the city - a proposal which he repeated in more detail on 24 May (OS).[75] Renewed preparations for an attack on the Island Battery were discussed on 17 May (OS),[76] and by 22 May (OS) Waldo was actively concerting these preparations with Gorham at the Royal Battery.[77] The mixing of officers and men from different regiments caused Waldo to write pessimistically to Pepperrell on 23 May (OS) concerning the planned attack, reporting that he could probably only get fifty or at most one hundred men from his regiment to volunteer for the operation. He did his utmost to recruit volunteers from other regiments, however,[78] and continued to aid preparations for the ill-fated attack up to its launching on the night of 26 May (OS).[79] ...

75. Ibid., pp. 175-180, Warren to Pepperrell, 16 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp. 21-23, Unsigned, 24 May 1745 (OS).

78. Ibid., pp.213-216, Waldo to Pepperrell, 23 May 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.212, Waldo to Pepperrell, 23 May 1745 (OS).

79. Ibid., pp.223-226, Waldo to Pepperrell, 26 Play 1745 (OS) / Ibid., pp.231-232, 27 May 1745 (OS).

The next year Franquet reflected this opinion when he wrote [111] that the general advice was to destroy the battery. Franquet himself, regarded this as a step to be taken only if absolutely necessary, and undertook, au an alternative, to find a method of rendering the battery's artillery harmless to the town. While admitting that the battery, once captured, would become a resource to the enemy, he insisted that it had been designed specifically to defend the entrance to the port, and observed that if it were to be abandoned enemy vessels would be tempted to run the gauntlet of the Island Battery's fire in order to gain access to the northeast anchorage, where only bombs fired at 1800 toise range (i.e., from the town), could hope to harm them. He stressed that while the battery remained in existence no enemy could think of attacking the town via the harbour, but recommended, in the event of an attack from any other quarter, that the battery be instantly abandoned and its artillery retired to the city on flat boats.

In this opinion he was supported by Prevost, who, writing to the Minister on 14 October 1750, repeated Franquet's apprehension that in the absence of a threat from the Royal Battery, enemy vessels might risk the Island Battery's fire in order to gain entrance to the port. [112] Roma likewise expressed similar opinions, stating that the battery was useful for the defence of the harbour, but incapable of defending itself against an attack from the landward side.[113] ...

111. AC C11B V.29 ff.306-315, Franquet to Minister, 13 October 1750 / Com. Téch. du Génie. Art.22 (MSS Réliés) Ms.205b, Franquet to Minister.

During this period there remained only six guns at the battery in the summer of 1755, however, Drucour doubled the number, [136] and the battery remained furnished in this manner until 1757, when Bois de la Mothe, fearing a repetition of the disaster of 1745 in the event of a British attack, evacuated the battery's one-hundred man garrison to the town, along with all its guns, some of which were placed in the Island Battery and some at the town itself. [137]

During British preparations for an attack on Louisbourg in 1757, it was initially assumed that the Royal Battery still mounted its offensive armament. A memorandum drawn up by J. H. Bastide in February of that year recommended the capture of the Royal Battery as an opening move in any siege, a suggestion which was repeated at the Council of War held in Halifax that July by Lt. Mitchell of the 45th. Regiment and Captain George Scott, on the grounds that the battery's capture would give the British control of the harbour and facilitate an attack on the Island Battery. [138] Knowles was at this time of the opinion that at least two 74-gun ships would be required to silence the Royal Battery, which he believed to be armed with "42-pounders". [139] Reports from French prisoners of war indicated, however, that some if not all of the battery's cannons had been removed. [140] ...

137. AN Marine Sér.B4 V.76 ff.20-25, Unsigned, Undated 1757 / AC C11C V.16 Pièce 13, Unsigned / WO34 V101 ff.92-134, Loudon and other, 23-30 July 1757. This is the evidence of a French officer. Other prisoners of lower rank contradicted his statements, alleging that only a few of the battery's cannon had been removed, but this seems to have been either a mistake or else a deliberate lie to confuse the British.

138. WO34 V.101 ff.135-137, Bastide, 10 February 1757 / Ibid., ff.140-144, G. Scott, Mitchell, 23-30 July 1757.

In the spring of 1744 the commandant, Duquesnel, decided to increase the size of the detachment at the Island Battery to include four officers on a rotating basis. A different captain was to be assigned to the fortification each month while the "lieutenants" and "enseignes" detached there were to be changed every 15 days. This staffing procedure was in effect from April to November 1744 [NOTE 56]

Meanwhile, back at Louisbourg, Verville was busy laying out plans for new batteries. He had a road built to the 'entry of the Port' -- probably to a point opposite the Island Battery -- and Saint-Ovide reported in October, 1716, that he expected shortly to drag twelve cannon to this point and to put them on the island in the spring of the next year. St.-Ovide complained that he and Verville were unable to obtain help from the ships' captains; but instead, they were aided by the enthusiastic inhabitants. Consolin, the aid d'artillerie on Ile-Royale, directed this project, as the gunner was not capable of the task. [12] ...

In the meantime [1717], the Conseil had written St-Ovide, expressing the hope that cannon would soon be moved to the Island. The same year, a memoire was sent to Costebelle and Soubras from the King, asking them to establish temporary batteries on the Island and on or near what was to become the site of the Royal Battery. [14]

14. B, Volume 39-5, June 26, 1717, ff. 286-287. C11C, Volume 16, pièce 6, "Memoire du Roi au Sr. de Costebelle ..."
_________

Probably as a result of the pressure exerted by the Conseil to put an end to the "lack of order in the artillery" -- two extra gunners having been sent out to aid Consolin [21-1] St. Ovide had a list of artillery drawn up in November:

6 l. ......................... 11 (6 of these may have been the brass cannon mentioned previously)

In an accompanying letter, St-Ovide asked that, in view of the large number of unserviceable cannon, the Conseil should send twenty 24-pounders from Rochefort to "form the battery on the entrance island." [21-3] This would seem to indicate that the only cannon which were operational at this time were those in the temporary battery on the site of the Royal Battery, if they were still there -- plus (perhaps) the six brass cannon on the site of the Dauphin Bastion, [21-4] and that no cannon had yet been placed on the Island ...

That summer, Conteneuil, master of the frigate Le Paon, had loaned the services of his ship's carpenters to St. Ovide and Verville in order to facilitate the strengthening of a lighter which was to transport cannon to the Island Battery. By September, Conteneuil had succeeded in putting seven 24-pounders on the island -- pieces which had been chosen from among the poorer guns in the colony -- but Verville observed that the Conseil would have to send several good pieces for the Island the following year. [22-1]

Though three pieces had been placed on each of the two flanks [of the Royal Battery] built over the covert way, its complement of ordnance, as well as that of the Island Battery, was far from complete. [19]

C11B, Volume 27, December 1727, ff. 315-318; B, Volume 52-2, June 18, 1728, ff. 578v-579v; B, Volume 52-2, June 20, 1728, ff. 588-592v.

In the summer of 1723, after learning of the presence of pirates in the area, Bourville had De Couagne build three barbette batteries. In one of these, near the fortifications on the "Butte du S^r Antoine", probably the Dauphin Bastion, he set up seven 12-pounders, while seven 24-pounders were put on the Island Battery... [23-6] ...

Maurepas had also expressed hopes that the Island Battery might be ready for cannon before the end of the summer, [26] but this proved to be impossible. In November, De Mézy promised Maurepas that this would be done in 1729, and that it would then be possible to install thirty-two 24-pounders on the Island. [27] He also hoped to have the Dauphin Bastion finished the next year. But all of this, he norted, would mean an increase in personal and equipment, and some of, the cannon would have to be dismounted and stored under shelter each winter to preserve the carriages. [28] ...

26. B, Volume 52-2, June 20, 1728, ff. 588-592v, ; B, Volume 52-2, June 23, 1728, ff. 549-597.

27. C11B, Volume 10, November 14, 1728, ff. 101-103; C11B, Volume 10, November 23, 1728, ff. 131-140; C11B, Volume 10, November 22, 1728, ff. 109-111v; C11B, Volume 10, November 24, 1728, ff. 112-117v.

28. C11B, Volume 10, November 22, 1728, ff. 109-111v; C11B, Volume 10, November 24, 1728, ff. 112-117v.

The may have moved some cannon to the site of the Island and Dauphin batteries, but despite Maurepas' hopes, expressed in May of that year, that the cannon would soon be properly set up in the Island Battery, [30] Verrier had to inform him in December that the plastforms were not yet ready. [31] Hence, in all probability, the canon had not been mounted ...

In December, Verrier was finally able to inform Maurepas that the cannon had been mounted on the Island Battery, though the platforms were not completely finished. [33] Presumably, these were the thirty-two 24-pounders mentioned in 1728, [34] though the accounts of the artillery on the Island during the siege of 1745 leave some room for doubt in this matter ...

33. C11B, Volume 11, December 2, 1730, ff. 74-79; C11B, Volume 11, December 3, 1730, ff. 16-22; C11B, Volume 11, August 20, 1730, ff. 14-15.

12 po. ............................................................................... 2 ... [33-1]

Carriages were also built for mortars at the Royal and Island Batteries. Whether any of these were put in place is less sure; all that can be definitely determined is that two 24-pounders had been transferred to the Lighthouse battery by the end of the year. [42]

In October, Le Normant sent a list drawn up by Lambert to the Minister, asking for ... brass 12-inch mortars for ... and two of the same size for the Island. [43] ...

42.B, Volume 61-2, May 4, 1734, ff. 607-608v; C11B, Volume 14, October 22, 1733, ff. 165-167v; C11B, Volume 15, November 4, 1734, ff. 205-207.

43. C11B, Volume 15, October 31, 1734, ff. 197-199v; C11B, Volume 15, November 4, 1734, ff. 205-207; C11B, Volume 15, October 31, 1734, ff. 190-193; C11B, Volume 14, November 5, 1734, ff. 393-393v.

48. There is a most interesting reference in one of the anonymous New England siege journals from 1745 (Louisbourg Journals, ed. De Forest, No. 1 (Ann) pp 17-18: "Our men found a number of cannon sunk in the water near the lighthouse, I understand the French were going to build a Fort there to defend the harbour (which I think is almost impregnable now). But our men are endeavouring to get 'em up to use them against the Island Battery."

On the basis of information presented so far, a tentative chart of the artillery distribution at Louisbourg is possible:

45. We know that there could not have been more than thirty-two 24-pounders on the island .... It also seems possible that some of the guns on the Island (See II, "1745") were not the 24-pounders listed here, but in fact English guns of an odd size. It appeared that several shifts were made in the artillery in this period. Two plans dating from about this time list alternately thirty-two and thirty-three cannon on the Island: N.D. "Plan de L'Isle de Lentree dans le port de Louisbourg avec sa Batterie de 33. canons de 24" (probably from 1720-1725), N.D. "Plan de la Batterie de Lislot de 31 canon de 24 a lentree du port de Louisbourg" (Probably c. 1720-1725). Two other plans, however, also this period, both show sixteen 24-pounders on the Dauphin Battery ...

In October, Le Normant again asked for an augmentation in the artillery, as follows: -

None of these had arrived by the end of the year, however, and the total complement of artillery remained the same: ...

... Some plans were made to place mortars on the Island Battery between the epaulement wall and the platform of the battery, but no action seems to have been taken. [52]

In the fall and winter of this year, some damage was reported to the gun-carriages at the Island and Royal Batteries, but this was large;ly confined to the axles and wheels; the bodies of the carriages 'made of oak and wild cherry [sic birch]' appeared sound enough. Steps were taken to repair this. [53] ...

53. C11B, Volume 18, December 20, 1736, ff. 122-126v; C11B, Volume 18, October 30, 1736, ff. 43-46v; C11B, Volume 18, November 6, 1736, ff. 289-294; C11B, Volume 19, October 30, 1737, ff. 37-41v.

The marginal notsations on the account would lead us to believe that some radical changes had taken place in the distribution of thr artillery; ...

However, since there is no documentary evidence that any changes took place, it appears that Sabatier was probably just noting down the types of guns which were placed at the different batteries, but not the quantity.

In all probability, the distribution remained the same as in the previous year ...

In October, De Forant and Bigot firmly rejected Maurepas' suggestion that the cannon should be dismounted and the carriages stored away during the winter ... [61]

Several other proposals were made for defence in that year. Someone suggested the old project of putting a few 36-pounders from the Royal Battery on the "rock in front of the Lighthouse" to force the enemy ships in behind Isle Verte. Verrier opposed this plan, pointing out that the position could be easily captured and its guns turned against the Island Battery. Instead, he proposed to set up cannon temporarily at Rochefort Point and to put a few mortars or cannon at the Island Battery to fire at vessels on the seaward side. These, he said, would produce the same effect. [62] ...

The distribution of this artillery was outlined by Maurepas in a letter to the new governor, De Forant, written that June:

24 l. .................................................................. 31 (mounted) ...[39-2] ...

In December, Duquesnel visited the batteries ... And suggested that Maurepas should grant the request made by Bourville and Bigot for new 24-pounders on the Island Battery to replace "the 18-pounders and bastard pieces so that the battery shall be complete and without a mixture of pieces. [40-3]

This is a somewhat confusing remark, as up to this point, the documents we possess make no mention of 18-pounders on the Island. The "18-pounders and bastard pieces" certainly seem to have been unknown to Maurepas when he sent his directive to De Forant in 1739. In November, Bigot wrote Maurepas that there were no serviceable 18-pounders at Louisbourg. [40-4] If this remark was not simply an error, it reveals that the figures given up to now for the artillery at the Island Battery must be treated with great care ...

In June, 1743, a memorandum on the condition of Ile-Royale was drawn up and presented to the King. This is probably the clearest and most complete statement of the period concerning the distribution of artillery: ...

Although no known document shows us when the two 9 pouces mortars were placed on the Island Battery, it appears certain that the battery did not exist during the siege, since the same artillery accounts drawn up at the end of the siege state that two brass mortars - one trunnioned and one cast whole - were found there. [44-6] ...

A provisional estimate of the distribution of the artillery at Louisbourg at the end of 1744, based on what has been said up to now, might be given as follows: ...

18 l. ............................................... 3 mounted (probably reduced to 2 shortly after the capitulation)

9 po. mortars (brass) ..................... 2 (1 trunnioned, 1 cast whole) ....

A week later, Bastide and Gridley drew up a list for the English which, as though to add to the confusipon, lists all the calibres in English measures: ...

The following is an approximate estimate of the distriution of this artillery at the begining of the siege (additional explanations for each of these figures has been given in the footnotes) ...

We know little of the distribution of artillery within the Island Battery itself, except that only a very small number of the cannon -- 3 or 4, plus a couple of mortars -- were directed against the Lighthouse Battery built by the New Englanders. Two of these cannon were dismounted during the course of the siege. [80] ..._________

80. C11C, Volume 16, pièce 26 (2e série), September 23, 1745; C11B, Volume 27, August 22, 1745, ff. 41-43v.

At the end of 1746, Ste.Marie had sent a statement to the minister and Drucour, listing the artillery in Louisbourg at the time of the surrender and the augmentations which would be necessary if Louisbourg were to be re-established as a stronghold. [86] ...

	Calibre	Total needed	Serviceable at Present in Batteries	To be Sent
...
Island Battery	24 l. .........	32 .........	...... 28..........	4

....

__________

86. C7 4, December 8, 1746, ff. 28-29

__________

1752 ...

We know nothing very precise concerning distribution of this artillery, but all the serviceable cannon are described as being "aux batteries" so they were apparently all in place.

It is known that there were ... 24-pounders at the Island ... All or most of these were operational in 1752, since all of these cannon mentioned were used that year, for signalling and to fire salutes. [113] ...

__________

113. C11B, Volume 32, September 30, 1752, ff. 309-312v.

__________

1753 ...

The only figure we possess is a on a plan drawn by Seliguy, a secrtetarty on board Hocquart's vessel the Bizarre, which listed 29 cannon at the Royal Battery and 34 at the Island [53-2] ...

1754 ...

Twenty-one cannon were supposed to be at the Royal Battery and thirty-four at the Island. [117] ...

_________

117. BN/C et P/131/11 9 (57) "Plan de la Ville et Rade de Louisbourg Vercours sur le Bizarre 1754". [MAP 1754-4]

_________

__________

1755 ...

The total of the guns facing on the harbour was reported as following: ...

At the Island Battery

24 l. ......................... 29

18 l. ......................... 3

8 l. ........................... 3 ...[55-4] ...

Later that year, in November, Drucourt drew up another list, with some slight differences from the preceeding one, of the complete distribution, and not simply of the guns facing the harbour: ...

At the Island Battery

Cannon

24 l. ................ 28

18 l. ................ 4

8 l. .................. 3 ... [55-5] ...

This, said Ste-Marie, was a well ordered complement of artillery: "all the batteries are mounted with their cannon, and the Platforms are remade". ...[120] '''

_________

C7, November 12, 1755, 4 fol. 30-31v

_________

1756 ...

In addition to these carriages, the local authorities also had four furnaces made to heat shot. These were situated at the Island, Rochefort Point, the Pièce de la Grave, and the Royal Battery, and were capable of warming twelve 36 or 24-pound balls to red heat in two hours ... [56-1] ...

1757

During his stay at Louisbourg, Du Bois de la Motte showed considerable concern over the defences at the mouth of the harbour. He had the Salvert battery extended, in order to be able to fire on bomb galiottes behind Ile Verte, and improved it with a barbette and a circular platform ... though no additional cannon were placed on it.

On the Island, he proposed to place an additional six or seven pieces on the revetment of the gorge, to be used for the same purpose, as well as to fire on vessels in the open sea. By October of the same year, nine or ten (probably nine) 36-pounders had been set up. Eight (or nine) of these, according to St-Julien, were put in a new barbette battery, and three of the older 24-pounders were established in another new barbette battery. Franquet, on the other hand, says that six of these new cannon were placed

in a return of the rounded section (en retour de l'arrondissement) towards the magazine, both to cover Ile-Verte and to fire on the vessels slightly off the entry to the port; and the 3 other pieces (were set up) behind the Barracks. [57-1] ...

St-Julien was less sanguine; he described Louisbourg as "a place which looks as if it had just been taken by storm: all the batteries are rotten, with not one ladle, not one ramrod, not one cannonball, neither on the batteries, nor on the Island: and yet a squadron of fourteen vessels is just outside the port."But even he did not question the size of the complement of artillery. [133] ...

__________

133. C11B, Volume 37, [1757], ff. 327-331v

__________

1758 ...

At the Brouillan Bastion ...

The guns in this quarter saw little action, but two mortars, presumably the two with the 10-livre capacity [Right fFce], were used to help defend the Island [155] ...

__________

155. Com Tech du génie, Art 22 (Mss reliés) Mss. no. 210d, p 63-117 (p 96, 28 juin)

__________

At the Maurepas Bastion ...

These cannon, like those at the Brouillan Bastion, saw little action, except in support of the Island battery. ... [58-4] ...

On the Island Battery

36 l. .................................................................................................... 10 (broken and dismounted by enemy fire)

24 l. .................................................................................................... 20 (5 broken and dismounted by enemy)

18 l. .................................................................................................... 4 (on gate of fort)

18 l. ...................................................................................................... 3 (on left part of gate)

9 po. mortar, brass, case whole, broken by the enemy ...................... 1

9 po. mortar, iron, cast whole, containing 5 l. of powder ................. 1

These guns faced in three directions: a battery "en fer à cheval" was directed into the open sea, a second section fired onto the port, and a third, consisting of three cannon, fired into the channel and hence against Wolf's lighthouse battery [58-5]

The Island received a hard beating from the English cannon; two of its guns were put out of action as early as June 26th, and one of the large mortars with a range of 1400 toises blew up at almost the same time. [157]

By 25 June, only three cannon were left trained on the Lighthouse, and these were removed from action to avoid drawing further English fire. [158] ...

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157. Arch du com tech du génie, Art 15, pièce no. 4 (Poisson des Londes); C11C, Volume 16, pièce no. 28, September 23, 1758; Arch du comité tech du génie, Mss. reliés no. 66, June 27, p. 64

158. C11B, Volume 38, June 25, 1758, ff. 57-103v.

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Appendix "A"

One of these mortiers à placque was thus described by an amazed New Englander in 1745: -

... Nextly of the Island Battery ... It mounts 31 cannon 24-pounders. There are two Morters, and one has a Solid-Brass-Bed-or Platform Cast with it; so that it's one with the Morter. [12] ...

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12. Anonymous Diary, First Journal, in Louisbourg Journals 1745, L. Effingham DeForest, editor, New York: Society of Colonial Wars, 1932, p. 52

[1745]
Letter of an old English Merchant to the Earl of Sandwich,
upon the Expedition to Louisbourg.—[From the Daily Advertiser.]
My Lord, London, April 22, 1775.

The Island Battery stood upon a small rock, almost inaccessible, about 20 yards broad, and 200 long, with a circular battery of 42 pounders, towards the neck of the harbour, in front, with a guard-house and barracks behind. How could they, the Americans, run away, then, on the first fire? Or where to? unless into the ocean; for the whaling and ship's boats were sunk, or obliged to draw off': As it was, they made a noble stand : one Brookes, an American officer, had nearly struck the flag of the fort, it was actually half down, when a French-Swiss trooper, clove his skull. Their courageous landing, their dragging of 18 pounders, several miles over rocks, and through morasses, their drilling of 42 pounders left in the deserted grand battery which had been spiked up by the French, and then conveying them round the north-east harbour to the light-house ; the speedy and close approach of the fascine batteries to the ramparts, and the general alertness of the successful besiegers, entitles them, surely, to more than a sneer; it justly entitles them to the real appellation of heroes : Could men, so circumstanced, exert themselves more ? Do such an handful of undisciplined soldiers deserve the opprobious epithets of cowards or poltroons ?

The admiral, it is true, blocked up the harbour effectually, and neglected nothing in the power of an experienced and valiant naval officer, on sea or shore, to assist the land forces; but did any one, besides your Lordship, ever hear him boast, that if he had acted otherwise, than by crouching and lying to cowards and poltroons, he should have taken the town ? Modesty is a constant attendant upon real merit; the admiral would have modestly insisted, that the fleet blocked up the port and did its duty, but that the army took the town.

You have been libelled, my Lord, or you have paid a poor compliment to the memory of Sir Peter Warren, and much poorer to the names of the brave North Americans who perished before the walls ; neither have you done justice to the survivers upon that expedition ; I bled in this business my Lord ; and, though an old Englishman, feel for the honour of the British

*"___ Inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay, New-Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode-Island ; 3,850 voluntary soldiers, principally substantial persons, and men of beneficial occupations ; this brave, determined, though undisciplined band of soldiers, embarked from Boston on the 20th of March for Canso; and, pray for us, while we fight for you, was the valiant and endearing language wherewith they animated their desponding countrymen, on their departure from their families, their fortunes, and their occupations."

In his fortification plans, Verville anticipated the possibility of attack overland by troops disembarked in the bays to the southwest. He was unconvinced, obviously, by arguments that the marshy terrain in that direction was impassable. As an engineer chiefly experienced in inland fortifications, he intended to build that landward front before arranging for the defence of Louisbourg harbour against a direct naval raid. As the Court ordered in 1717, the main bastion was to be built in masonry first, the remainder of the front in earthworks. Subsequently, the latter would be finished in masonry and the future Island and Royal Batteries constructed. [44] The details of the landward front are succinctly described in the following instruction to Verville, and can be read in conjunction with several of the latter's plans and sections: [45]
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Louisbourg had an absolute construction priority over other ports until some attention was paid to the latter in the 1730s. The French Court decided on extensive fortifications for Louisbourg, and for six years (1719-1725) Verville was given virtually a free hand in their development. However expensive, the fortress (in conjunction with privateering during wartime) was seen as a cheaper method of protecting the rejuvenated cod fishery than the reconstruction of the French navy would ever have been. By selecting an experienced officer of the military engineer corps as director of fortifications for the colony, the government committed itself, moreover, to fortress-building on a scale unprecedented in North America. Engineer-corps officers favoured metropolitan contractors like Isabeau, [47] Frangois Ganet and
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Nevertheless, the building was far from being finished. In 1723, continually bad weather threatened its very survival, according to Saint-Ovide. [58] Another problem was the serious illness of the contractor, which heralded his death the following year. As Verville wrote ungrammatically in August:

A plan of 1724 gives a general idea of the point reached by that year. [60] The contract with Isabeau did not include the Royal and Island Batteries proposed by Verville for protecting the harbour from a direct naval attack. Verville virtually ignored these structures until the winter of 1722-1723, when at Versailles he was instructed not only to

finish the citadel barracks, but also to make a start on the batteries. [61] A plan of 1722 shows the terrain of the Royal Battery site. [62]

Agitation by Saint-Ovide for the appointment of a resident chief engineer finally gained approval after the Comte de Naurepas was named minister of marine in 1723. In 1724, Etienne Verrier wag appointed to serve as chief engineer under Verville. In 1725 Verville was transferred to Valenciennes in France; Ile Royale no longer had a director of fortifications. [63]

One of several important tasks facing Verrier was the satisfactory completion of the citadel. Verville had blandly reported, it in 1724 to be fully defensible, if not quite complete. [64] Saint-Ovide doubted that Verrier's best efforts would ever make the barrack building completely suitable, especially for accommodation. [65] The roof leaked everywhere; its pitch was not steep because Verville had feared the force of Atlantic gales more than he had feared melting snow. [67] The brick was defective

1730. A makeshift roof had to suffice until July of that year. [93] While waiting for the slate, Verrier designed the clock tower for the building. [94]

Work on the harbour defences was done concurrently with that on some of the other structures. Initially, the Royal and Island Batteries were designed to complement one another without help. Subsequently, Verrier added a battery in the gorge of the Dauphin Bastion, facing the harbour, to increase the amount of crossfire to which attacking ships would become subjected and to make it more effective. [95 ]Some excavation at the site of the Royal Battery had been carried out in 1721-1722, but work began in earnest in July 1725 following the contract award to Franqois Ganet. The foundation and the two towers shown on a 1725 plan were built that year six to seven feet above the floor of the ditch. Materials were stockpiled at the site. The battery had its own limekiln. [96

The faces of the battery were finished in 1726; the merlons were erected 212 pieds; the barracks were ready to receive their roof; the towers were constructed to the level of the crenellated room; and the counterscarp was finished. On November 7, 1726 the battery suffered a setback. Twenty-four to thirty pieds of the circular counterscarp, [97] still exposed to the sea instead of being protected by a dam, were destroyed. The sea had also carried away boards and sand and the stonecutter's workshop. On the same day a gale removed from the west tower a temporary roof that had been installed to protect the masonry from water and snow. [98] Yet by the end of 1727, the covered way and glacis, and the twin towers, were all constructed. A shortage of freestone and of stonecutters halted further-masonry work, leaving the embrasures unfinished. Moreover, the roof and gun platforms remained to be done. [99]

The obtuseness of the flanked angle of the battery (due largely to the need for a 200-man structure squeezed between the harbour and the hills to the north) reduced its command of all parts of the harbour. This was offset to some degree by the co-ordination intended among the Island, Royal and Dauphin Batteries. Their crossfire was supposed to make a

frontal attack on the harbour extremely unprofitable to an enemy. However, the Royal Battery was defective in any event, for the northeast arm of the harbour was inadequately covered. Flanks had already been added; to cover the northeast arm better, Verrier recommended in 1728 an extension of the left flank. By the time of its completion in 1731, it had become an installation for four guns and two mortars. 100
Island Battery

The role intended for the Island Battery may be seen in a plan referred to above. [101] Access to the small island by boat was (and still is) extremely difficult, even in a relatively calm sea. It is almost impossible in very rough seas. Excavation at the site began before

1723, [102] but stockpiling of construction materials--difficult because of the smallness of the island--did not begin until 1726, when plans for work in 1727 were submitted. [103] By the end of the latter year, two-thirds of the masonry of the external face were finished to the level of the bavette. Completion of the battery in 1728 depended on the despatch of more stonecutters from France. [104] By the end of 1728, the masonry of the battery was finished, [105] and a year later that of the barracks. Space taken up by building materials impeded progress on the gun platforms, [106] which were finished, finally in 1731. [107] The powder magazine was completed by December, 1730 but the masonry of the arch

required three or four years to harden before the supports could be remove. [108]

A cistern had been planned for the storage of fresh water on the tiny island, but its construction was delayed by supply problems. [109] By the end of 1732 Verrier had observed the devastating effect of sea spray on all the structures. The proposed cistern was in a very exposed position. [110] The following year, Verrier recommended the storage of fresh water in barrels--from 60 to 80 would suffice during a siege, according to his estimate--instead of constructing a cistern. [111] He also submitted a plan showing a new wall or (épaulement facing the open ocean, which would protect the rear of the battery from both the sea and attacking ships. [112] The Court approved its construction at a cost of 6,200 livres. [113]

Delays in 1734 and 1735, combined with fresh damage in another part of the battery, may have saved the Crown a little money. Frost and spray caused the masonry of the merlons to disintegrate. Verrier recommended replacing the Upper two pieds of the merlons by sod. Not

only would this arrest the effect of the climate, but it would protect the gunners from stone splinters during bombardment. The saving was supposed to come from using fieldstone from the merlons in the construction of the épaulement. The Court approved the proposal. [114] Work was finished during the summer of 1736.

Since the battery was not manned between December and April, maintenance was inadequate. The barracks were in danger of rapid deterioration. The roof required reinforcement against wind, waves and spray. Chimneys and fireplaces made of local flat stone, not thick enough to resist the weather, had to be rebuilt with cut stone from the merlons. A stockade was built around a rock to the right of the battery's flank, to prevent possible landings at the point. Another stockade was recommended for the left side of that flank to block the entrance to the embrasures of the face, which were no more than four pieds above ground level. [115]

Verrier provided in October a plan and sections, [221] and a memorandum, [222] in which Saint-Ovide's proposal was seriously put forward in detail.

The cost of building the proposed new front of fortification was estimated at 277,360 Livres. The Court was thus faced with a major defence expenditure, presumably after having been under the impression that the works planned for Louisbourg at the beginning of the 1720s would suffice. [224] Confronted by a strong consensus in the colony in favour of

common for a coat of masonry 20 or 30 yards long to slip away from the main body of the wall.

Bastide, the senior engineer attached to the British forces in 1745, summarized the repairs required at the Island Battery as follows: repairing embrasures, rebuilding chimney stacks, doors and windows; glazing and lining the masonry, at a cost of £529/10/0. * He estimated the repairs required at the Royal Battery as follows: repairing the masonry of the walls and embrasures; repairing the roof, doors, windows; glazing most of it; palisading and cleaning the ditch, at a cost of £721/16/0.* He advised his commander to enclose the Island Battery with a palisade to protect it from. the rear. As for the Royal Battery, he considered it very difficult to defend against attack from the hill above it. Palisading and other protection against surprise or sealing of the walls was all that could be done in addition to common repairs.

The Island Battery was criticized as being very badly designed and built. It was defenceless from the rear. The rubble stone walls were boarded up to keep them together. Except at the corners of the merlons, the cement was extremely bad. It could not hold out long if bombarded from the Lighthouse Point. The workmanship of the Royal Battery was considered to be no better than that of the Island Battery "being cased with boards to keep the walls from falling .... [268]

face of the rampart on large timber supports. The inside wall of the parapet of the right face had been rebuilt, four new embrasures constructed. Most of the stone platform covering the casemates of the left flank was reconstructed in order to keep the casemates dry. Nevertheless, some part of the King's Bastion was always disintegrating: the worst places were the faces and angles. One of the latter was completely separated from the solid masonry. Inside the Queen's Bastion, four buildings, each two storeys high, formed a quadrangle with a court sixty yards by fifty yards. The lower building, for officers, had not been finished. At the Queen's Gate, in the curtain between the Queen's Bastion and the Princess Bastion, next to the guardhouses, two barrack sheds each 100 feet long and one storey high had been put up in great haste. On the face of the Princess Bastion, the rampart had been raised and widened, a strong timber platform for ten guns en barbette had been made, and a gallery under the bastion had been fitted out and turned into a powder magazine. A powder magazine with a capacity for 2,000 barrels, of timber and brick "well secured against fire" had been constructed in the Brouillan Bastion. Between the Brouillan Bastion and the Pièce de la Grave, a strong fence of three-inch plank (a palisaded way) had been built on the long stockaded bridge. The Maurepas Gate was in bad condition. The Island Battery was repaired, except that the merlons and the embrasures were in need of some work. The Royal Battery was palisaded in, and the barracks repaired and made "more lodgeable", but the old gun platform was badly decayed. [p. 100]

a raising of the curtain wall between the Dauphin and King's Bastions by 5 to 6 pied3 would accomplish it.

Franquet also assessed the works outside of the town. The lighthouse was repaired. The careening wharf would have to be redone entirely, in the same cove or in a neighbouring one. The Island Battery was undoubtedly the most useful of the fortifications. Nevertheless, although its surrounding rock seemed to make it inaccessible, the English had found ways of landing there; Franquet wished to find methods of preventing a recurrence of this. As for the Royal Battery, most people favoured destroying it as a greater menace to the town than a protector. Franquet did not agree. True, its artillery could be used against the town and inflict great destruction; yet, if it were demolished, and vessels were able to run the gauntlet of the Island Battery and reach the northeast arm, the ships would be out of range of other artillery. To prevent the artillery of the battery from being of use to an enemy who might capture it from the rear, it should be abandoned at the first word of any landing by the enemy in the vicinity of Gabarus Bay, and its artillery transferred to the town on flat boats. [275]

The amounts assigned to individual items, though based on the engineer's proposals, were modified not only to conform to policy and priorities, but also to accommodate certain fixed charges. Thus, the salaries and gratuities for 1724 and 1725 still included payments to Verville and his son (for 1725, a residue), whereas those for successive years were free of that charge. Having decided on a total allocation of 150,000 livres, against which 14,800 in 1724 represented a fixed charge, the Ministry directed most of the remaining 135,200 toward a good start on the Royal and Island Batteries, stores building and hospital, and toward accelerated work on the citadel barracks and King's Bastion. In 1725, when the fixed charge had decreased to 8,100 livres and work on the barracks had advanced (in quantity, if not in quality), the amounts for the Royal Battery, stores and hospital could be increased by 5,000 livres each, while the barracks required 20,000 less. To finish the King's Bastion, there were 35,000 livres: 22,800 more than the previous year. The Ministry made it clear that no funds would be provided for other structures of the west front until work had been finished --- or substantially finished-on the priority items. [64]

In succeeding years, Verrier's annual estimates reflected a vain hope for an allocation of 150,000 livres in addition to salaries and gratuities. His proposals for certain items were pared down to provide for the 7,400-livre fixed charge. For 1726, for example, the figures
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The engineer's estimates could thus be reduced by about 6% on the Royal Battery and 10% on the hospital, without seriously disturbing the order of priorities.

Enceinte incl. -
Crenellated Wall. 20083 32800 51873 83886 76011 92625 72824 100964 62620 56777

action to replace him, for the unfinished work on the citadel barracks and King's Bastion was the legal responsibility of the contractor's heirs. What the Department did was to award to François Ganet, a builder in France who had underbid Isabeau in 1724, the contract for the Royal and Island Batteries and for the transport of the materials required for the construction of the hospital and the King's stores.[43] In Paris, Ganet apparently tried to persuade his predecessor's father and principal heir, Arnoud Isabeau, to let him assume the risks and profits pertaining to the unfinished work. [44 ]When Ganet arrived in the colony, the governor, the financial commissary and the new resident engineer (Etienne Verrier) were anxious for him to work on the citadel barracks, in order to prevent degradation of the structure and to make it ready to accommodate the troops. Ganet's priority according to his instructions, however, was to commence work immediately on the works for which he had been contracted. [45]

Ganet was not reluctant to bow to local pressure if there were profits to be made from taking over Isabeau's work. [46] What ensued was a complex legal tangle that could have been avoided if the Court had given special orders for work on the barracks during the 1725 season, or if the local authorities had devised a method of continuing that work without involving Ganet; and if Ganet had adhered to the letter of his